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8
Informal Trading Networks 
in West Africa: The Mourides 
of Senegal/The Gambia 
and the Yoruba of Benin/Nigeria
By Stephen Golub and Jamie Hansen-Lewis
A theme of this study is that the informal sector in West Africa stems largely 
from the institutional environment and the incentives that fi rms face (chap-
ter 6). In particular, weak and corrupt state administrations fail to provide the 
foundations of formal markets such as property rights, contract enforcement, 
and information dissemination. An additional consideration, however, is that 
informal business operations are perpetuated by informal institutions that sub-
stitute for state provision of public goods. Informal institutions are pervasive in 
all economies, but they are particularly signifi cant in developing countries (Cas-
son, Guista, and Kambhampati 2009). Ethnic and social kinship groups are an 
especially signifi cant informal institution, providing a set of norms of conduct 
and enforcement mechanisms that substitute for formal rules and regulations. 
Ethnic and social networks are a form of “social capital” (Barron, Field, 
and Schuller 2000), which can have positive as well as negative eff ects on eco-
nomic development. On the plus side, social networks create bonds of trust 
that enable contract fulfi llment, access to fi nancing, and information exchange 
without documentation or offi  cial involvement (Putnam 1995; Fafchamps 
2004). Kinship groups play a particularly important part in international trade, 
helping to overcome transaction costs created by lack of information and dif-
ferences in business practices across countries (Rauch 2001). Kinship networks 
have a major role in informal cross-border trading in West Africa, as will be 
described further and in the following chapter. On the negative side, however, 
social capital in general and informal networks in particular can be exclusion-
ary, accepting or even promoting antisocial behavior and violation of the rules 
and norms in the formal economy (for example, Adhikari and Goldey 2009; 
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Field 2003; Portes 1998). Munshi and Rosenzweig (2006) provide an illustration 
of the complex interactions in India between a traditional network—the caste 
system—and the modern global economy. Again, this is clearly manifested in 
West Africa insofar as kinship networks are heavily involved in illegal activities, 
particularly smuggling and tax evasion. Overall, ethnic and religious networks 
are particularly signifi cant in West Africa because of the combination of weak 
formal institutions and the continuing importance of kinship ties dating from 
the precolonial era and the resistance to colonialism.
North’s (1989) concept of institutions also provides a helpful conceptual 
framework for understanding the informal sector. North distinguishes between 
formal institutions (“rules”) and informal institutions (“norms”) and argues that 
both are important in shaping the possibilities for economic development. In 
both modern and traditional societies, formal and informal institutions have 
evolved to mitigate opportunistic behavior, but modern arm’s-length capital-
ism involves a very diff erent set of institutions than traditional village society. 
In chapter 6, we focus on formal institutions involving the protection of prop-
erty rights and the functioning of state institutions. Th is chapter completes the 
picture by analyzing some of the informal institutions, particularly kinship ties, 
that shape informal sector behavior in West Africa.
In this chapter, we analyze these issues by reviewing the history, function-
ing, and consequences of two informal networks in West Africa—the Mourides 
and the Yoruba. Th e Mourides are a Muslim brotherhood that originated in the 
nineteenth century, while the Yoruba are an ethnic group predating the colonial 
era. Th ese networks retain important economic functions. Th e bonds of soli-
darity among members of the group provide a social foundation for informal 
markets in West Africa, particularly in cross-border trade, both fi lling the void 
left  by defi cient offi  cial institutions as well as contributing to the weakness of 
these institutions.
The Mourides in Senegal and The Gambia 
Th e Mouride Islamic brotherhood plays a major role in the informal sector in 
Senegal and Th e Gambia and has developed an extensive global trading network 
spanning West Africa, Europe, and the United States.1 Th e Mourides’ strong 
group solidarity and unsurpassed work ethic have enabled their remarkable 
transition from rural groundnut farmers to one of the most dynamic urban 
trading groups in Africa. 
Historical Background 
Th e Mouride movement arose in the aft ermath of the defeat of the Wolof nation 
by the French colonial army in the late nineteenth century (O’Brien 1971). 
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Wolof society was in a state of political and social disarray. In this context, 
Islam, which had been implanted in Senegal in the eleventh century, assumed 
increasing importance, with religious leaders known as marabouts providing 
spiritual and organizational guidance to their followers, the talibés. One of these 
marabouts, Cheikh Amadou Bamba, attracted a growing number of talibés, 
due to his charismatic personality, his personal virtue, and his close association 
with Wolof leaders of the resistance to French rule. His growing following and 
increasingly militant behavior led the French authorities to exile him to Gabon 
and Mauritania, which only served to boost his reputation and the devotion of 
his followers. Aft er repeated entreaties by his disciples, Cheikh Amadou Bamba 
was released and returned to Senegal in 1912. 
Following his return, the French established a strategic partnership with 
the Mourides. Cheikh Amadou Bamba moved to Diourbel in the region of 
Baol, and his principal disciples were granted large tracts of land for agricul-
tural development. With backing from the French, the Mourides specialized in 
groundnuts, which became the dominant cash crop in Senegal and Th e Gambia 
for the remainder of the century. Meanwhile, Cheikh Amadou Bamba founded 
the village of Touba, where he was buried and which became the spiritual capital 
of the Mourides. 
Cheikh Amadou Bamba created a tradition of submission by the talibés to 
the leading marabouts and, in turn, an obligation of the marabouts to assist 
their talibés, leading to both a clear hierarchy and a sense of group solidarity 
within the Mourides. Th e Mourides continue to revere him as a saint, provid-
ing an enduring and powerful symbol of authority and legitimacy to the group. 
Th eir shared devotion to his memory is the spiritual foundation for cohesive-
ness of the group. Th is allegiance was transferred to his successors. 
A monarchic system of succession has been established, with a pyramid hier-
archical structure in which the caliph-general is the supreme leader. Th e caliph-
general is the closest living descendant of Cheikh Amadou Bamba. Below the 
caliph-general are the other caliphs, also descendants of Cheikh Amadou 
Bamba or of his leading associates. Under the caliphs are sheikhs (marabouts 
with disciples), with varying degrees of prestige and number of disciples. A cer-
tain fragmentation of authority and rivalry among them has diluted the power 
of the sheikhs, but the basic structure has proven very robust.
A central tenet of Mouride faith is to express devotion to the sheikhs through 
hard work and self-deprivation. Cheikh Amadou Bamba exhorted his follow-
ers to “Go and Work” (O’Brien 1971, 57). A well-known Mouride aphorism 
refl ects the confl ation of work and faith: “Pray as if you will die tomorrow and 
work as if you will live forever” (Bava 2002). In a feudal-like system, the talibés 
contribute produce or money to their sheikhs, which has enabled substantial 
accumulations of wealth. Mourides donate much greater amounts to their lead-
ers than other Islamic sects. In exchange, the talibés, who tend to come mostly 
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from the poor and disenfranchised elements of the population, obtain access to 
an extended social safety net, in addition to a strong sense of belonging and the 
promise of paradise. Th e sheikhs are expected to be generous toward their fol-
lowers, particularly those who are unable to work due to age or illness. Sheikhs 
may also provide credit at more favorable terms than traders. Th e extent of 
devotion of followers as well as the generosity of the sheikhs varies consider-
ably, but these traditions of mutual obligation are nonetheless pervasive and 
enduring. 
Th e tight solidarity of the Mourides and their faith enabled them to resist 
colonial infl uences and to maintain their group identity, even while engaged in 
strategic cooperation with the French colonial authorities (Diouf 2000). 
Membership in the Mouride brotherhood expanded continually in the 
twentieth century, with the city of Touba becoming the second largest in Sen-
egal, aft er Dakar. Touba now has 500,000 inhabitants, up from 5,000 in 1960. 
Mourides view Touba as their spiritual home no matter where they live. Th e 
Great Mosque in Touba, the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa, is the destination 
of an annual pilgrimage (magal) to honor Cheikh Amadou Bamba, attracting 
hundreds of thousands of Mourides every year. Touba has become a de facto 
separate city-state within Senegal and is essentially off -limits to the political 
authorities. In addition to the Great Mosque, contributions by the faithful have 
fi nanced the construction of a US$10 million hospital, a Mouride cultural cen-
ter and library, and other monuments and institutes.
Mourides and the Groundnut Economy 
Th e strategic allegiance with the French revolved around groundnut production 
and trade, with the Mourides increasingly dominating the sector, accounting for 
two-thirds of production during the colonial era (O’Brien 1971). Until the late 
1970s, Mourides remained overwhelmingly rural, continuing to grow ground-
nuts, which are well suited to Senegal’s climate and soils. 
Following Senegal’s independence in 1960, the Mourides maintained their 
political infl uence, transitioning from their close ties to the French to strong 
connections to the ruling Parti Socialiste. Mourides translated these political 
connections into economic gains, benefi ting from easy access to farm credit 
(oft en not reimbursed) for planting groundnuts and substantial de facto control 
of the groundnut trade and transport, in theory in the hands of the government 
(Lambert 1996). Th e clientelistic operation of the groundnut industry contrib-
uted to the Senegalese fi nancial crisis of the 1980s and the subsequent period of 
structural adjustment and trade liberalization. 
Mourides developed distinctive forms of social organization around the 
groundnut trade. Mouride young men are organized into daras, which are farm-
ing brigades accompanying their religious education.2 Mouride daras were at 
fi rst isolated and worked under arduous conditions, with no nearby access to 
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water. Th ey served the function of colonizing unoccupied land, thereby extend-
ing the domain of the Mourides. Conditions have improved over time, with 
daras now mostly consisting of parcels of a sheikh’s estate, but life as a worker 
on a dara remains one of deprivation and hard work in service of the sheikh, 
with minimal remuneration. Aft er many years on a dara, a worker may receive 
a plot of land of his own (O’Brien 1971; Copans 1980). 
Most Mouride peasants are now independent smallholders, but some con-
tinue to work on the large estates controlled by sheikhs. Even when not in a 
dara, however, the Mourides benefi t from the advantages of membership in 
a close-knit group, while also meeting their obligation to provide substantial 
off erings to their leaders. Usually, one day a week is designated to work on 
the sheikh’s fi elds, called “Wednesday fi elds” (O’Brien 1971, 210). Th eir cohe-
siveness, sense of purpose, and political backing enabled the Mourides to dis-
place other groups and take control of increasing swaths of land for groundnut 
cultivation. 
Mouride farming techniques are not geared toward preserving Senegal’s 
fragile ecosystem, however. Unsustainable cultivation techniques, deforesta-
tion, growing population, and droughts have contributed to deteriorating land 
quality and desertifi cation, reducing the incomes of groundnut farmers. Declin-
ing groundnut prices and reduced subsidies to farmers associated with struc-
tural adjustment policies have also contributed to lower farmer incomes. Th ese 
trends spurred an increasing migration of Mourides toward urban areas in the 
1970s (O’Brien 1988; Babou 2007).
From Groundnut Farmers to Urban Traders 
Mouride migration to the cities occurred in several phases in the twentieth 
century, with the largest movement beginning in the 1970s. Mourides have long 
been groundnut traders in the cities of the groundnut region. It was, therefore, 
natural that Mourides gravitated toward the informal sector and commerce in 
particular, as they moved to the cities. Th e fourth caliph-general, Abdou Lahat 
Mbacke (1968–88), actively promoted the establishment of the Mourides in 
the cities, unlike his predecessors (Babou 2007). Th e sprawling open-air infor-
mal market of Sandaga in Dakar has become the Mourides’ center for informal 
commerce, paralleling that of Touba for the Mourides’ spiritual life. Th e Okass 
market in Touba is also a very important distribution center.
Th e Mourides’ rural traditions were adapted with remarkable fl exibility and 
eff ectiveness to their new urban settings. With family ties and traditional beliefs 
holding the group together, the Mourides were able to generate a new set of 
urban connections and economic activities. Th ey congregate in neighborhoods 
wherever they go, which they rename “Touba” (Diouf 2000). 
Th e dahira became the central institution of urban life for the Mourides, in 
some respects replacing the role of rural daras in providing spiritual nurturing 
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and promoting economic success. Th e dahira consists of a weekly reunion of 
local Mourides for religious singing and discussion, as well as collection of 
dues. Th ese fees support the local branch of the group as well as the traditional 
donations sent back to Touba for the general support of the organization. Th e 
dahira also serves as an informal meeting place for exchanging information and 
assistance about business opportunities and government relations. Newcomers 
to the cities are assisted by the more established members of the group, much 
as the talibés are helped by the sheikhs in the countryside (O’Brien 1988). Th e 
dahira is emblematic of the mixture of central structure and informal collabora-
tion that has proved to be remarkably eff ective. While the Mourides are linked 
by their common faith and devotion to the leadership in Touba, there is very 
little overt central direction, and the dahiras function autonomously and com-
pete for infl uence. Dahiras themselves provide umbrellas for individual initia-
tive and networking rather than prescribed relationships.
Th e peanut farmers’ emphasis on hard work and saving has carried over to 
the cities, with commerce replacing agriculture. Th e cohesiveness of the Mou-
rides and their deep relations of trust have proven to be extremely valuable in 
fostering their informal commercial network. Group solidarity and belief in the 
higher purpose of the brotherhood support the fulfi llment of promises and obli-
gations without any formal contracts. Mourides almost never default on loans 
or commitments to other Mourides, as to do so would be viewed as a breach of 
religious as well as commercial bonds. 
Mourides coming to the cities are oft en provided with work as street vendors 
by successful Mouride businessmen. Th ese businessmen mentor young street 
vendors—oft en, but not exclusively, Mourides—by providing goods on credit 
and assistance with housing and food. Th e street traders work long and ardu-
ous hours in the heat and grime of Dakar and other cities, much as the peas-
ants toil on the peanut farms. Aft er a long apprenticeship as a street trader, the 
more successful and enterprising workers can rise in the hierarchy of trading 
activities and perhaps start a business of their own, just as workers on daras are 
sometimes allotted plots of land aft er years of work with minimal remuneration. 
In their hard work and deprivation, the street traders are sustained by the hope 
of advancement as well as their faith that honoring Cheikh Amadou Bamba 
will entitle them to enter paradise. At the same time, the abundant supply of 
reliable and low-cost workers has enabled urban traders to accumulate sub-
stantial fortunes; it also has supported the leadership and central organization 
of the brotherhood in Touba and, in turn, its ability to assist members, thereby 
providing funding for a social safety net and information distribution system. 
Sandaga market is the center of the Mouride trading activities in Senegal 
and, indeed, the world. Large wholesalers are at the top of the operation of the 
mazelike trading networks, with a varied assortment of goods for sale. Ebin 
(1992) describes the functioning of Sandaga market through an ethnographic 
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study of the Fall family, originally cloth traders from Kaolack who had close ties 
with a former caliph-general. Cheikh Fall, one of the fi ve Fall brothers, heads 
the enterprise, due to his business and entrepreneurial acumen. A former street 
trader, he moved to New York, where he purchased African American cosmet-
ics, which he then sold in Senegal. Aft er eight years in New York, he returned to 
Senegal and started a factory producing hair extensions, which was highly suc-
cessful. His brothers then left  Kaolack to assist him in his business ventures. Th e 
Fall headquarters are in Sandaga, where at the time of Ebin’s report, they had 
three large stores. In addition to the ubiquitous street vendors, major wholesal-
ers such as Fall employ a variety of other intermediaries, including resellers 
who purchase in bulk, nyoro who locate clients and bring them to the store in 
exchange for a small commission, scouts who fi nd other retailers who might 
want to purchase merchandise from wholesalers, and spotters who announce 
the impending arrival of a potential client. Wholesalers are able to diversify risk, 
lower transaction times, and expand their scale of operations by increasing the 
number of clients and suppliers, so making contacts and developing relation-
ships are of central importance. Ebin’s stories show how successful merchants 
mentor other traders who go on to start their own businesses and, in turn, 
become clients and suppliers of their mentor. 
In addition to domestic commerce and international trade, Mourides have 
increasingly dominated other important sectors in the cities of Senegal, notably 
transport and real estate, all of which operate informally despite their large size. 
For example, the minivans that serve as the major mode of public transport 
(cars rapides) are oft en owned by Mourides and frequently colorfully decorated 
with references to Touba. 
Th e increasing economic role of the Mourides has not been achieved with-
out confl icts, however, and has created tension with other groups. Th ere are 
also tensions within the Mourides between traders and intellectuals (O’Brien 
1988). Nevertheless, the group remains very powerful and eff ective, thanks to 
the nearly fanatical devotion, work ethic, group solidarity, and political clout 
of its members.
Globalization of the Mouride Trading Network 
Th e infl ux of the Mourides to the urban centers of Senegal and Th e Gambia was 
accompanied and fostered by the international migration of Mourides to major 
cities in Europe and then to the United States, with the brotherhood becoming a 
highly eff ective international trading group. Th e Mourides’ global network and 
business practices have been chronicled by many researchers, including Salem 
(1981), Fassin (1985), Ebin (1992, 1993), Diouf (2000), Babou (2002), and Tall 
(2004). Th e story of the Mourides is one of amazing commercial reach. 
In various cities around the world, Mourides congregate in Senegalese neigh-
borhoods and dahiras, sharing information and providing mutual support and a 
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springboard to commercial success. Th e cities are linked by family and kinship 
networks, headed by a wholesaler usually located in Sandaga. Sheikhs based in 
Senegal coordinate the travels of their talibés, as part of the services they ren-
der in exchange for the off erings they receive. Th e young Senegalese emigrant 
Mourides live together in cramped quarters, oft en in dangerous neighborhoods, 
facing harassment from the authorities and not seeing their families for long 
periods of time—reminiscent of the hardships of life on the rural daras. Ebin 
(1992) quotes a wholesaler dealing in electronics: “We are used to sleeping on 
the ground, not eating much, and working until exhaustion. It’s what we have 
always done.” 
Starting in the 1960s, Mourides migrated to cities in France, where they 
became street traders. Th ey operated throughout France, particularly in Stras-
bourg in the north (Salem 1981) and Marseilles in the south (Ebin 1992). Th eir 
focus has been on selling trinkets and simple consumer goods to tourists dur-
ing the summer season, oft en returning to Senegal in the winter. Th e Mourides 
were able to outcompete French merchants through hard work and lower prices, 
even learning German in Strasbourg to communicate with German tourists, for 
example. As French immigration policies became more restrictive, the Mourides 
spread around Europe, in particular to Italy. In the mid-1980s, New York emerged 
as a major destination, where they also became successful street traders. 
Experienced traders travel to New York, Jeddah, and Hong Kong SAR, 
China, where they purchase large volumes of a wide variety of electronic and 
cosmetic products, which they sell in Senegal and in other countries. Mouride 
shipping and fi nancial agents in New York are also in contact with Asian trad-
ers, who supply some of the goods such as watches, sunglasses, and cosmetics 
that are the mainstays of the Mouride value chain. Th e goods are imported 
into Senegal through informal mechanisms and end up at Sandaga or other 
urban markets. In some cases, traders bring back the goods themselves in large 
trunks and suitcases. Sandaga and other markets are also supplied by contra-
band imports shipped through Th e Gambia. As described in more detail in 
the following chapter, low import duties in Th e Gambia have provided a major 
incentive to import offi  cially into Th e Gambia and then smuggle the goods into 
Senegal. Goods may also be shipped through the port of Dakar, where customs 
practices are notoriously discretionary and Mouride traders use their political 
connections to evade the statutory duties. 
Fassin (1985) details how Mourides smuggle and illegally sell pharmaceutical 
products in Senegal, as also noted in chapter 4. Th e favored route is through Th e 
Gambia; products are brought to Touba via Kaolack, hidden in trucks fi lled with 
hay. In addition, unoffi  cial supplies of drugs are obtained from hospitals and the 
national pharmaceutical importer, Pharmacie Nationale D’Approvisionnement, 
and sold openly in well-known locations, with the tacit acquiescence of the 
government. 
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Ebin (1993) provides a vivid description of a Mouride trading group’s oper-
ations in Marseilles. Almost all of the members of the group originate from 
a Mouride town in Senegal, Darou Mousty. Mustapha Sow, the leader of the 
group, supervises and assists younger traders newly arrived from Senegal, who 
have been put in contact with him by their sheikhs. Mustapha Sow’s operations 
extend all along the Mediterranean coast, starting from his base in Marseilles. 
Sow sources from Mouride runners who steadily arrive in Marseilles with prod-
ucts from Spain, Italy, North Africa, and Asia. One of his main suppliers is 
also from Darou Mousty. Sow himself goes to Paris every Monday morning to 
replenish his supplies following the weekend sales to tourists. His main supplier 
in Paris is a Moroccan who employs a Senegalese Mouride, Mamadou Ndiaye, 
known to the Mourides as the focal point for all information about merchandise 
and contacts in the Paris region. Ndiaye can supply traders such as Moustapha 
Sow with a large variety of merchandise or tell him where to obtain it. Sow 
returns to Marseilles Monday aft ernoons with his newly purchased stock of 
goods, which he distributes through a large number of street vendors who oper-
ate all around the region, runners who supply other traders, as well as wholesal-
ers heading to Senegal to sell at Sandaga and elsewhere. In short, the Mourides 
operate in Marseilles much as they do in Dakar.
By the early 1990s, Senegalese Mourides controlled most street trading in 
New York, selling watches, umbrellas, T-shirts, and hats (Babou 2002). Over 
time, they invested their savings in other services, mainly shipping, travel, and 
money transfer services for Senegalese and other African immigrants in the 
United States. New York increasingly developed into a major hub in the Mou-
ride trading networks. Ebin (1993) describes how Pape Faye, another Mouride 
from Darou Mousty, served as Moustapha Sow’s emissary to New York City. 
Faye started as a trader in Dakar but left  Senegal in 1979 and now travels all 
around Europe, buying and selling. Ebin (1993) describes Faye’s fi rst visit to 
New York, which was organized by his sheikh. At that time, Senegalese from 
Darou Mousty lived and congregated in an apartment in the Bronx and gath-
ered in the Flatbush neighborhood in a place called the House of Serigne Touba. 
Currently, Senegalese Mourides are concentrated in Little Senegal, a section of 
Harlem around West 116th Street (Ebin 2008; Babou 2002). Many Mourides 
who started as street vendors now own stores in that area. Th e stores sell a 
variety of products, including cosmetics, religious objects, compact discs, and 
digital video discs, and phone cards. Th e House of Islam is the center for Mou-
rides in the neighborhood, a building purchased under the guidance of one 
of the grandsons of Cheikh Amadou Bamba. Several loosely cooperating and 
competing dahiras operate in New York City. 
Mouride wholesalers such as Cheikh Fall and Mustapha Sow have con-
tacts around the world with whom they can be in instant communication 
by telephone or Internet. Mouride traders use modern communication and 
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information technologies to advance their commercial transactions, in particu-
lar fi nancial transfers (Tall 2004). Th ey know whom to contact when they want 
to buy or sell particular types of merchandise at the lowest prices and are very 
nimble in adapting to changing supply and demand. For example, prior to the 
African Cup of Nations soccer tournament, wholesalers such as Cheikh Fall, 
anticipating the rise in demand for televisions, may contact a Mouride working 
in New York who has contacts in China (Ebin 1992). For other products, such 
as jewelry, wholesalers turn to their networks in Italy.
Th e strong bonds of solidarity among Mourides enable sophisticated inter-
national fi nancial transactions without any contracts or collateral, minimizing 
transaction costs and detection by the authorities (Tall 2004). Merchants in San-
daga serve as fi nancial intermediaries for fund transfers to and from Senegal. A 
Mouride residing in the United States or Europe wishing to repatriate funds can 
remit the funds to a correspondent of a large merchant in Senegal, who, in turn, 
distributes them to the emigrant’s family. Th ese funds are an important source 
of working capital for traders. Alternatively, an itinerant trader may make trans-
fers home as an advance: the merchant provides funds to the emigrant’s family 
in Senegal, and, on his next trip home, the emigrant repays the merchant with 
proceeds from the goods he took back for sale in Senegal. 
Th e Kara international money exchange was started in 1991 by a Mouride 
trader in New York, providing a sophisticated, yet informal, money transfer 
mechanism for use by merchants traveling between New York and Dakar, allow-
ing them to travel without carrying large sums of money (Tall 2004). Illiterate 
traders can avail themselves of this system, as little or no documentation is 
required. Merchants traveling to New York deposit funds with the Kara offi  ce 
in Dakar before they leave Senegal and then have access to the funds when they 
arrive in the United States. Likewise, a trader in New York transfers money 
home by bringing cash to the Kara offi  ce on Broadway, which remits the funds 
to the designated benefi ciary in Senegal, who can obtain the money without any 
paperwork. Communication between the Kara offi  ces in New York and Dakar 
is by fax, and transmission of funds to the recipient is nearly instantaneous and 
highly secure, despite the lack of formalities. Mouride connections are suffi  cient 
to guarantee fulfi llment of obligations and deter embezzlement, because a viola-
tion would betray the values of the brotherhood and also lead to cutoff  of credit.
The Yoruba in Nigeria, Benin, and Togo 
Historical Background 
Th e Yoruba are among the most populous and urbanized ethnic groups in Sub-
Saharan Africa. Most Yoruba speak a common language, also called Yoruba. 
Yorubaland, the traditional region of the Yoruba ethnic group, encompasses the 
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central areas of Benin and Togo and the southwestern states of Nigeria, includ-
ing Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Osun, Ondo, Ekiti, and Kwara. Historically, Yorubaland 
was a mix of loosely connected kingdoms. While each kingdom was indepen-
dent, they all regarded the city of Ile Ife, located in the Nigerian state of Osun, as 
the common place of origin, orirun. Th e kingdoms operated autonomously but 
maintained political and economic ties to each other. Th e hierarchical organiza-
tion of the group around chiefs is in some ways similar to that of the Mourides 
and their marabouts.
Barter was likely the earliest form of trade among the Yoruba. One advan-
tage of Yorubaland’s fertile soil was that each kingdom was capable of produc-
ing slightly more food than required for subsistence. As a result, the minimal 
surpluses could be bartered among kingdoms to supplement other basic needs, 
such as clothing and shelter. An extensive societal division of labor, includ-
ing ruling elites, manufacturers, herbalists, priests, historians, entertainers, and 
farmers, facilitated barter in a range of goods-for-goods and goods-for-services 
transactions. Furthermore, as the Yoruba became increasingly sophisticated, 
they demanded more exotic goods to maintain the elite’s extravagant lifestyles 
and to use in ritual festivals (Falola and Adebayo 2000).
Th ere are many notable examples of barter in the early Yoruba economy. 
In the agriculture sector, farmers openly traded with each other. For instance, 
farmers who grew mostly yams tended to exchange yams for millet with farm-
ers who grew primarily millet. Also, farmers exchanged produce for tools with 
blacksmiths. Priests and herbalists accepted valuable and edible items, oft en 
animals and palm oil, for their services. Entertainers were paid with left over 
food, expensive costumes, horses, or slaves. Imported goods such as natron (a 
cleaning substance) and salt were bartered through long-distance trade. It is 
estimated that, around the fi ft eenth century, the barter exchanges evolved into 
monetized trade using cowry shells as currency.
Th e Yoruba economy eventually expanded into a regional trade network, 
notably through the trans-Saharan caravan trade (Falola 1991). Extensive long-
distance trade routes through West Africa were well established before the 
arrival of Europeans on the continent. Th e caravan trade developed systems of 
credit, transport, information exchange, settlement of business disputes, and 
insurance among separate peoples without modern institutions to perform 
these services (Cohen 1969), promoting economic integration among ethnic 
groups.
Regional trade fostered the Yoruba’s interaction with their northern neigh-
bors: the Nupe and the Hausa. Th e lack of geographic barriers separating these 
ethnic groups facilitated their cooperation in connecting the region’s goods to 
the major trans-Saharan trade routes (Perani and Wolff  1999). Th e Hausa, in 
particular, had long participated in regional trade. Th e Yoruba provided live-
stock to the network and received skilled Hausa slaves. Th ey also provided 
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luxury goods, such as salt and natron, to the Egba and Egbado groups to the 
south. Th e most northern kingdom of Yorubaland, Oyo, came to dominate 
regional trade, even operating a cavalry, because of its strategic location. Th e 
Oyo controlled trade in Yorubaland and some surrounding areas until the end 
of the nineteenth century, with a major market at Apomu (Falola and Adebayo 
2000; Eades 1993). Th is lucrative trade was a major source of political power.
Beginning in the sixteenth century, European involvement in the Yoruba 
economy shift ed the focus of regional trade toward the coastal areas, where 
the Europeans initially operated. Th e Ijebu increasingly controlled the lucrative 
trade with the Europeans along the Atlantic coast. While the Oyo lost commer-
cial stature to the Ijebu, the European involvement did not aff ect the historic 
inland trade network as much as it did the coastal routes. Europeans sold the 
Ijebu cowries and manufactured goods in exchange for slaves and cloth. Th e 
Yoruba were advantageously located to transport the European goods north. 
Th e slave trade made Benin, then called Dahomey, a key location in the inter-
national triangle trade and introduced new goods such as tobacco into the 
regional market.
Many Yoruba traders operated out of Porto Novo and Ouidah in Dahomey at 
the end of the nineteenth century (Igué and Soule 1992), working with repatri-
ated slaves of Yoruba origin from Brazil. Some traders became very wealthy and 
famous in the region. France’s colonization of Dahomey in 1894 had a profound 
eff ect on the Yoruba networks. While the repatriated Brazilian slaves cooperated 
with the French, local Yoruba people converted to Islam and developed clan-
destine networks with Nigeria to escape colonial controls and trade barriers.
Th e Rural Markets System 
As of the mid-twentieth century, the Yoruba’s historical trade relations remained 
important despite the eff ects of colonization and European involvement (Cohen 
1969). Trade in Yorubaland and the surrounding region was supported by 
daily and periodic markets in urban and rural areas, servicing local and long-
distance trade routes (Eades 1980). In addition to the markets in rural towns, 
“rings” were organized outside the larger towns. Th e “ring” markets operated on 
four- or eight-day cycles. Th ese markets operated with considerable sophistica-
tion. For instance, “forestallers” would wait in the trails a few miles before the 
 markets in an eff ort to buy the traders’ goods for slightly less than the market 
price and then resell them in the market for a small profi t (Hodder 1961).
Th e Yoruba traded locally produced and imported manufactured goods, 
notably textiles, as well as local foods and food products (Eades 1980). Manu-
factured goods were exchanged outward from the major urban centers to rural 
areas for agricultural goods that moved inward from the rural areas to the 
urban centers. Women supplied farm produce at the rural markets, including 
maize, cassava, yams, bananas, kola nuts, tomatoes, okra, and other vegetables, 
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in addition to producing and selling pots, calabashes, palm oil, palm wine, 
fi rewood, bundles of leaves, and yam fl our (Hodder 1961). Since each woman 
dealt with only a small quantity of goods, bulking was a central component of 
the agricultural trade as goods moved toward the cities. In the urban markets, 
large expatriate and Lebanese fi rms in Lagos and Ibadan supplied manufactured 
goods to the system. Since urban Yoruba wholesalers oft en bought the goods 
in bulk and distributed them in smaller quantities to retailers, bulk breaking 
characterized this side of the trade. Nonetheless, the erratic supply of manufac-
tured goods underscored the importance of well-established connections in the 
trade routes. Raw material shortages, import delays in ports, and price controls 
all contributed to the unreliable supply of manufactured goods (Eades 1980).
Th e markets were highly competitive and dominated by large amounts of 
low-volume transactions, so profi tability was low. Th e numerous middlemen 
who moved goods from town to town drove profi ts down to almost nothing for 
most transactions (Hodder 1961). 
Women dominated the low-margin Yoruba retail trade. Eades (1980) esti-
mates that in 1950 women constituted 84 percent of traders in Ibadan and 
70 percent in Lagos, refl ecting the traditional division of labor in Yoruba society. 
Men were mostly involved in agriculture, while women were more likely to be 
involved in processing and selling their husband’s produce. If a husband felt that 
his wife did not trade his produce at a fair price, he was free to sell it to another 
woman. Many women even sought capital from their husbands to expand their 
personal enterprises. Hodder (1961, 154) asserts, “To Yoruba women, moreover, 
marketing, petty trading, or at least attending a market, forms part of their way 
of life; and their rewards lie as much in the social life off ered by the markets as in 
their cash profi ts.” Despite women’s active participation in petty trading, social 
barriers frequently prevented them from ascending the trade hierarchy. Men 
could accumulate capital for several years before marriage, enabling them to 
enter into more lucrative wholesale trade. Meanwhile, women married and had 
children at younger ages, so their domestic responsibilities signifi cantly limited 
their trading enterprises. As a result, even though the majority of Yoruba traders 
were women, the upper echelons were dominated by men (Eades 1980).
Migration 
Th e rural market system and long-distance trade fostered a Yoruba diaspora 
across West Africa in the twentieth century (Eades 1980). Yoruba migration 
and trade expanded for several reasons. First, Yoruba laborers and artisans who 
amassed suffi  cient capital tended to migrate to impoverished savannah towns 
to become traders (Eades 1980). Second, in nearby countries, particularly in 
Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, large plantations and mining projects created oppor-
tunities for migrants as laborers and traders. Th ird, regional demand for con-
sumer goods increased along with incomes. Yoruba traders sold cloth made in 
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western Nigeria in regions further east, bringing back kola nuts from Ghana to 
Nigeria (Sudarkasa 1985). Yoruba migrants were particularly active in north-
ern Ghana. Th is east-west trade increasingly came to include slaves, leather 
goods, cattle, and Ghanaian textiles. Fourth, the British brought many Yoruba 
to Accra to fi ght against the Ashanti. Many of the Yoruba established themselves 
in Ghana. Fift h, cash crop failures in tobacco and cotton in Nigeria, in conjunc-
tion with construction of the Lagos-Kano rail line, increased Yoruba’s interest in 
moving to francophone West Africa (Igué 2003). 
By the latter half of the twentieth century, the Yoruba had spread across West 
Africa into Côte d’Ivoire, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Senegal, although the gov-
ernment of Ghana expelled many Yoruba in 1968. Solidarity among the Yoruba 
contributed to their successful migration in a wide geographic area. Successful 
traders brought relatives to assist them with their enterprises, who eventually 
established their own businesses. Th is organization was central to the Yoruba’s 
success in international trade, much like the Mourides’.
Modern Trade Networks 
Th e Yoruba remain at the center of a large, informal sector international trade 
network in West Africa, facilitated by kinship ties, varied market tactics, and 
hierarchical organizational structure, although the group is less clearly struc-
tured than the Mourides (Igué and Soule 1992; Igué 2003). Yoruba tend to 
transact with other Yoruba traders because of trust, common language, and 
similar business styles (Sudarkasa 1985). Th e belief in Islam is a source of soli-
darity and motivation, as it is for the Mourides. A well-developed informal sys-
tem of tontines is limited to members of the Yoruba group, fostering economic 
ties among the group members. Th e operation of Yoruba supply chains is not 
well understood, however, due to the secretive nature of smuggling and high 
illiteracy rates of traders, resulting in poor recordkeeping (Igué 2003).
Th e Yoruba deal in a large variety of products and sources in various desti-
nations, which have changed over time. Th ey have been particularly dominant 
in the sales of plastics and medicines. When Ghana restricted imports from 
Europe in the 1960s, Yoruba traders collected products from Nigeria, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Sierra Leone, and Burkina Faso to transport clandestinely to Ghana. 
Starting in the 1970s, Yoruba traders have distributed plastics produced in Côte 
d’Ivoire throughout the region. Generic medicines are oft en imported from 
English-speaking countries of the region where regulations are less stringent. 
Registered companies in Togo, Benin, Nigeria, and Ghana import certain other 
goods, such as enamel and cosmetics, from China, which the Yoruba smuggle 
across the region (Igué 2003). For goods sold in Ghana, Yoruba traders obtain 
the products wholesale in Kumasi and Accra from Yoruba supply centers.
Th e structure of migrant trading families is similar to the gender roles in 
Yorubaland. Th e head of the family, who is traditionally male, negotiates the 
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supply of a range of goods with domestic and international suppliers. Mean-
while, the wife manages the products and supervises their sale. She may, in turn, 
redistribute the goods to young female street traders. Th is structure underscores 
the importance of migrating in groups. Women constitute the majority of trad-
ers and play a key role in the success of Yoruba enterprises. Yoruba women are 
well known for their resilience and patience at trade. Moreover, the hierarchical 
organization enables apprentices and other beginner traders to learn the prac-
tice before starting their own enterprises (Igué 2003).
Th e Yoruba have long played a leading role in smuggling between Nige-
ria and Benin, going back to the colonial era (Flynn 1997). Th e oil boom in 
Nigeria and Nigerian protectionism in the 1970s provided a major stimulus 
to the Yoruba smuggling activities. Th e Yoruba have been the dominant play-
ers in the reexport trade between Nigeria and Benin in most products, aside 
from rice and wheat (Igué and Soule 1992, 100), as described in detail in the 
following chapter.
Yoruba traders reach their customers through an array of transactions on 
the streets and exchanges in market stalls and shops. Street trading is the most 
informal of the Yoruba’s activities. One technique is for groups of young traders 
to carry products to several villages during a day trip. Th e groups bring their 
goods to a village where they display, publicize, and sell them before circulating 
to another village, reaching many per day. Th ey oft en operate in open, public 
spaces so as to attract the attention of the villagers. Another informal technique 
is for some Yoruba traders, mostly young women, to go through neighboring 
towns, selling at people’s doorsteps. Th ey display their products in small mobile 
shops and persistently encourage buyers to make a purchase. Igué (2003) out-
lines specifi c benefi ts that the Yoruba obtain from these strategies. First, by not 
having a permanent shop, traders save the expense and taxes of owning one. 
Second, they can access remote areas. Th ird, they can better understand the 
preferences of their customers and where to distribute each product.
Besides working in the streets, Yoruba traders also occupy a range of posi-
tions in urban markets. Like the informality of street trading, stalls in markets 
also help traders to understand their buyers’ tastes. Stalls are small tables that 
are set up early in the day to display a trader’s products and taken down at the 
end of the day. Since the stalls have low start-up costs, apprentices oft en main-
tain them. Th ey are most common in Côte d’Ivoire, where they off er clothing, 
plastic shoes, watches, and underwear. Profi ts from stalls are fairly low, limited 
to around CFAF 1,000 per stall per day (Igué 2003).
Yoruba traders also use market shops for their enterprises. Yoruba shops are 
known for the plastic goods commonly displayed at the entrance, which are a 
sign of their monopoly in the plastic trade. Th e products are oft en organized 
so that only the shopkeeper is capable of locating them. Th e shops also have 
some advantages for Yoruba traders. Th e larger the shop, the more the owner 
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can purchase in bulk and store the products. Shops also allow the owners to 
meet more sophisticated customers who appreciate posted prices, in addition 
to uneducated customers they reach in village markets (Igué 2003).
Th e activities of Yoruba shops vary somewhat across countries. In the 1970s, 
Niger had a small number of Yoruba shops, possibly fewer than 30, all of which 
were unregistered with the Niger government. Th ese shops fi t into three cat-
egories: food, clothes, and general. Th e shops were operated by the owners and 
their family members and did not employ local people. Th e value of the trans-
actions at that time was estimated at CFAF 50,000–CFAF 100,000 per shop per 
day, and the owners were the wealthiest migrants; some even owned nice cars 
to park in front of their shops. Alternatively, in Côte d’Ivoire, Yoruba shops 
were more widespread, despite the immigrant expulsion in 1968. Before 1968, 
the Yoruba accounted for about 70 percent of shops in the country; in 1978, 
the Yoruba share fell to a still-large 60 percent. Aft er 1968, most shops became 
much smaller. In addition to making Yoruba traders in Abidjan more cautious, 
competition from other migrant groups increased aft er the 1968 expulsions 
(Igué 2003). 
In general, the Yoruba traders are skilled at fi lling gaps in regional mar-
kets. If another ethnic group has a monopoly of supplying a certain good, the 
Yoruba will not attempt to sell it in that area. As a result, the traders’ techniques 
and choice of products greatly depend on the region in which they are trading. 
For instance, in Burkina Faso, Yoruba sell cosmetics and spare bike parts. In 
 Niamey, Niger, where people from Gao monopolize cosmetics and the Zarma 
and Gourmanche control bike parts, the Yoruba sell enamelware, plastics, and 
ironware. Instead of locating themselves in the central buildings of urban mar-
kets, where other groups operate and space is expensive, the Yoruba frequently 
operate in sheds on the periphery of urban markets (Igué 2003).
In the Dantokpa market of Cotonou, the largest open-air market in West 
Africa, Yoruba traders are important participants, along with other ethnic 
groups (Prag 2010). Dantokpa is a center for the regional cross-border trade 
described in chapters 4 and 9. Large and small informal operators are both 
prevalent. Dantokpa is similar to Sandaga in Dakar and other sprawling infor-
mal markets in West Africa, but no single ethnic group dominates in the ways in 
which the Mourides dominate in Sandaga. Th e Chamber of Commerce is domi-
nated by Yoruba traders from Porto Novo. Other ethnic groups with historical 
trading relations with the Yoruba, such as the Adja and Mina, also play a major 
role in Dantokpa. Prag (2010) describes the shift ing competition and coopera-
tion among various interest groups in Dantokpa and their ethnic dimensions. 
Th e government has attempted to assert control over the market and modern-
ize it, with the backing of some market participants, but these eff orts have been 
blocked by an alliance of large and small informal traders.
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Traditional Social Networks and the Modern 
Informal Sector 
Th is section synthesizes the central features of the two groups (Mourides and 
Yoruba) and relates them to contemporaneous informal sector practices as they 
emerge from previous chapters of this study. 
Th e social background of informal actors places them in opposition to many 
Western-style norms. Lack of education is a crucial feature. Most informal entre-
preneurs have little or no modern education. Instead, they were trained in daras 
or similar types of apprenticeships. Th e Mouride daras have a strong religious 
component as well, but this is not always so. Even today, very few young people go 
through the formal education system imported from the former Western colonial 
powers. In fact, traditional education remains a strong competitor to modern 
education (Mbaye 2002; Gérard 1995; Meunier 1995). Surveys in Mali show that 
36 percent of parents prefer informal education. Meunier (1995) fi nds that enroll-
ment in informal schools is growing almost twice as fast as in formal schools. 
Th ere are a number of key diff erences between the French education system in 
francophone Africa and the traditional forms of schooling. Th e French system 
was and still is oriented toward preparing students for white-collar jobs, particu-
larly in the civil service. In contrast, African traditional education is much more 
practical and is well suited for developing entrepreneurial skills. Consequently, 
many parents and students are more drawn to traditional forms of education, in 
part explaining the low levels of participation in offi  cial schools (Mbaye 2002). 
Th ere are many similarities between long-standing traditional practices in 
African society and informal sector behavior. Th e role of women in the infor-
mal sector parallels that in African villages. Th is is particularly evident among 
the Yoruba, where the traditional gender-based division of labor in agriculture 
extends to informal trading. In agriculture, women do not own land, and men 
are responsible for cultivation; women’s role is to sell the produce in small stalls 
in the markets. Th us women constitute the majority of traders, but men usually 
control the business and the capital. Likewise, in the informal sector, women 
tend to operate small-scale shops and are concentrated in trading activities. Th e 
family-centeredness of informal businesses also parallels traditional societies. 
Large and small informal fi rms, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5, rely heavily 
on family ties for loans, staffi  ng, and more, although this tends to diminish as 
a business grows (Lyons, Dankoco, and Snoxell 2008). Moreover, the sectors in 
which the informal sector dominates, such as commerce and handicraft s, cor-
respond to the main activities in traditional African economies.
Allegiance to traditional sources of authority, such as the Yoruba chiefs and 
the Mouride marabouts, is far more binding than the authority of the modern 
state. 
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Th ere are both similarities and diff erences between the Mourides and the 
Yoruba organization. Th e Yoruba are an ethnic group based on family, whereas 
the Mourides are bound together by a form of Islam that encompasses several 
ethnic groups but is heavily infl uenced by the traditional Wolof ethnic group. 
Th e hierarchical structure is similar. Both groups are supported by belief in the 
mystical power of their leaders. Th e chief is the repository of the entire lineage’s 
mystical power and instills both fear and respect such that no one will chal-
lenge him. Politicians seek his electoral favor as well as his blessing. Th e story of 
Khadim Bousso in chapter 4 illustrates the power of the caliph of the Mourides. 
Conclusion 
Th e Mourides’ and the Yoruba’s trading activities illustrate the continuing 
importance of informal trading networks operated by kinship networks. Th ese 
groups originated many centuries prior to European colonization and have 
adapted to the colonial and postcolonial economic environments. Th e social 
and religious bonds linking members of the groups enable complex and fl ex-
ible trading strategies with property rights and contract enforcement provided 
by group solidarity rather than formal rules. Adherence to Islam plays a major 
role in the solidarity of both groups. Th e Yoruba and Mourides both have hier-
archical organizations, although this is much more pronounced and formalized 
among the Mourides.
Th e descriptions of the Mourides and the Yoruba presented here bring out 
the close connection between the informal sector in general and trading in 
particular. Indeed, to this day, trading is the foremost activity of the informal 
sector, as seen in chapter 3, involving both domestic and cross-border dimen-
sions. Th e trading networks of the Mourides extend to Europe, Asia, and North 
America in addition to Africa. Th e trading sphere of the Yoruba is confi ned 
largely to West Africa. Th e interplay of historical, cultural, and economic factors 
is important in understanding the central role of informal trading activities in 
West African economies. 
Th e structure and operation of these informal networks grow out of tra-
ditional African societies. Th e norms and institutions of the informal sector 
exert a powerful infl uence on West African economies, notably how markets are 
organized, the continued prevalence of traditional forms of education, the role 
of women, and so forth. Allegiance to religious leaders and traditional chiefs is 
oft en much more powerful than allegiance to the modern state.
While group solidarity and mutual trust enable the expansion of commercial 
activities, the political and economic infl uence of these groups is not entirely 
benign. Th eir main markets, such as Touba and Sandaga in Senegal and Dan-
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tokpa in Benin, are largely off -limits to the government, enabling these groups 
to engage in smuggling and tax evasion in plain view of the authorities. 
Notes 
 1. Lisa Cabral of Swarthmore College assisted in preparing this section, which is par-
tially based on a visit to Touba in October 2007.
 2. Th ese groups are unlike daras in other sects, which focus exclusively on religious 
education. 
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